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Abstract. Agricultural marketing co-operatives are one among a myriad of options that farmers have to market their 
products,  making  survival  of  the  co-operative  formula  to  depend  on  its  capability  to  compete  for  the  farmers’ 
satisfaction and membership. This research uses Neoclassical Theory and Transaction Costs Theory to propose a 
number of antecedents of the farmers’ satisfaction with the co-operative and their intention to remain members in the 
long term. With data obtained from a sample of 320 producers of fruits and vegetables, members of agricultural 
marketing  cooperatives  operating  in  the  fresh  fruit  and  vegetable  chain,  the  results  obtained  show  that  1)  the 
liquidation price is more important to predict the farmers’ satisfaction with the co-operatives than their intention to 
remain members; 2) transaction costs are important to explain satisfaction and to a larger degree the intention to 
continue the relationship with the co-operatives; and 3) that liquidation price is more effective upon satisfaction and 
continuity if transaction costs are lower. 
Keywords:  Agricultural  co-operatives,  Transaction  Costs  Theory,  Neoclassical  Theory  of  the  firm,  satisfaction, 
continuity, liquidation price, safeguards, adaptation, performance evaluation. 
1. Introduction 
Producers of agricultural products in general and fruits and vegetable in particular are generally faced 
with the critical question of selling their production. In the fresh fruit and vegetable chain, several 
alternatives, or governance modes, compete to offer a suitable alternative to farmers (see Figure 1). These 
options, which actually compete against the co-operative, range from pure integration, represented by the 
option of direct distribution, to formulas such as auction centers where very close to pure market 
transactions happen
[30]. Each alternative represents a different combination of three basic interdependent 
economic components of a transaction relationship, namely (1) the allocation of value (or the distribution 
of gains from trade), (2) the allocation of uncertainty (and any associated financial risk), and (3) the 
allocation of property rights to decisions bearing on the relationship
[30]. In particular, agricultural 
marketing co-operatives represent a moderate level of integration since farmers are in fact owners of these 
organizations, created to bargain for better prices, to handle, to process and to sell their members’ 
agricultural productions. Members are not only owners, but also users and controllers of a business that 
distributes benefits equitably on the basis of use or patronage
[5].  
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Figure 1. First level selling governance alternatives in the fresh fruits and vegetable supply chain 
 
Marketing co-operatives however constitute a special type of vertical integration for farmers, first, 
because the integration of the member firms, which still maintain their independence, is only partial, with 
a market element (the transaction relationship) and a hierarchal element (the control relationship) and, 
second, because the co-operative is owned by all member firms together
[7]. This confers to the 
relationship established between the farmer’s firm and the co-operative a critical role in the study of co-
operatives leading us to conclude that, whether marketing co-operatives can remain significant players in 
the agrofood system and particularly in the fresh fruit and vegetables supply chain is a question of 
whether farmers’ interests are better served by remaining members of a co-operative than by using any 
other feasible alternative
[25]*.  
Therefore, the members’ satisfaction with the co-operative and their intention to remain in the co-
operative in the long run become two variables of critical importance to determine the possibilities of the 
co-operative organizational form. This research explores the antecedents of these two variables. The point 
of departure of this research is the neoclassical assumption that marketing co-operatives serve their 
members’ interests by marketing their products at better prices than those that could be obtained by the 
farmer by remaining independent
[25]. In terms of the Neoclassical View of the Firm, farmers would be 
motivated by the maximization of benefits principle, so that they would pay attention to returns to the 
input they supply to the co-operative, i.e., to the liquidation price received for the product supplied to the 
co-operative
[21]. However, other points of view have been recently applied to provide a finer focus by 
which to analyze relationships in co-operatives, mostly under the heading of the New Institutional 
Economics, with Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) as one of the most relevant
[8] [9] [34] [30]. TCE pays 
attention to the transaction costs, i.e., the costs of organizing transactions and managing relationships. 
Although the analysis of agricultural co-operatives by means of using TCE is not rare
[24] [23] the number of 
empirical studies are scarce and, to the best of our knowledge, application of TCT to the explanation of 
the members’ stance toward co-operatives by means of using an empirical study over a significant sample 
of farmers is missing in the literature. 
The main purpose of this research is to empirically assess the theoretical assertion about the incremental 
role of transaction costs over the explanation that the liquidation price provides of the members’ 
satisfaction with agricultural marketing co-operatives and their desire to maintain the relationship in the 
long run. Moreover, by delimitating the three main problems that generate transaction costs, namely (1) 
the problem of safeguarding, (2) the problem of performance evaluation, and (3) the problem of 
adaptation, the second goal of this research is to figure out the differential importance of each one in 
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influencing satisfaction and the desire to maintain the relationship from the viewpoint of the member. 
Finally, by means of an analysis of the interaction between the liquidation price and the transaction costs 
we will test to what extent the influence of the liquidation price on the dependent variables changes for 
different levels of transaction costs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, the dependent variables and the theoretical discussion 
about their antecedents are presented. Then, we discuss the methodology of data collection, the scales 
used for measuring the concepts as well as the methods of data analysis and the results obtained. We 
finalize the paper with a brief section on conclusions and implications. 
2. Research hypotheses 
Adopting  the  general  definition  of  satisfaction  in  business  relationships  (e.g.,  [3]),  the  member´s 
satisfaction with the co-operative can be defined as a positive affective state resulting from the appraisal 
of all aspects of the farmer´s working relationship with the co-operative
[14]. Satisfaction is therefore an 
affective state that, nonetheless, is directly caused by a summary assessment of outcomes
[3]. The appraisal 
of outcomes obtained from the co-operative has the result of satisfied (or unsatisfied) members as they are 
compared to a base of evaluation
[3]. According to the postulates of the theory of interpersonal relations
[33], 
one member of a co-operative would feel satisfied when he perceives that outcomes equal or surpass: 1) 
the  quality  of  outcomes  the  member  of  a  marketing  co-operative  has  come  to  expect  from  the  co-
operative, based upon present and past experience with the co-operative and other similar relationships, 
and knowledge of other farmers’ similar relationships and 2) the member’s average quality of outcomes 
that are available from the best alternative exchange relationship. The concept of satisfaction with the co-
operative is consistent  with  measurements of relationship’s performance  found in the literature (e.g., 
[31]). The underlying logic is that satisfaction is a focal consequence of a working partnership
[28] as the 
one established between a farmer and his marketing co-operative. It is not only a close proxy for concepts 
such as perceived effectiveness, but it is also predictive of future actions by the co-operative’s members. 
Previous research has indicated that satisfaction with a business relationship is instrumental in increasing 
morale,  cooperation  between  the  parties,  trust  and  commitment,  and  in  reducing  litigations  and  the 
propensity to terminate the relationship
[12] [13]. 
About the intention on the issue of whether to continue in the co-operative or search for other alternatives, 
the member becomes increasingly aware of the inherent problems as well as the benefits that may be lost 
if operations ceased, members will have to consider their long-term strategic options (tradeoffs between 
the benefits and costs) and decide whether to exit, continue, or convert into another business form
[25]. The 
farmer’s intention to remain as member of the co-operative, the opposite of its exit intention, is therefore 
the direct result of its overall satisfaction that, on its side, is also influenced by the attractiveness of the 
best alternative relationship
[27]. Therefore, the first hypothesis states:  
H1.   The member’s satisfaction with the co-operative positively influences his/her intention 
to continue in the co-operative.  
From a Neoclassical point of view, agricultural marketing co-operatives
[7] and other types of growers’ 
associations are created to counterbalance the oligopsonistic (if not monopsonistic) power of processors 
and distributors of farm products, which is a consequence of the fact that their efficient size (due to 
economies of scale) is larger than the efficient size of the farming activity. In this sense, farmers generally 
have felt that they sell their outputs in markets with no control over the price and, therefore, their recourse 
to marketing co-operatives may be perceived as a mean to achieve some measure of redress
[21]. Once the 
co-operative has been formed with the goal of enhancing the producers’ prices by bargaining
[16] the co-
operative performance will be a function of the difference between the price returned to members and that 
received by non-members still suffering the oligopsonistic exploitations of processors and distributors
[15]. 
According to this, the cooperative’s optimization objective consists on maximizing benefits to members 
by  maximizing  the  per  unit  value  or  average  price  by  distributing  all  earnings  back  to  members  in 
proportion to their patronage volume or use
[17]. 
The importance of liquidation price is therefore critical not only as a reason to form but also to maintain 
co-operatives when competitors adjust their prices and members of co-operatives seeing that they are 
achieving no difference in the current prices offered by competitors and those of their own association, 
particularly  where  a  differential  was  observable  in  the  past,  may  become  disenchanted  with  the  co-
operative and withdraw their support
[21]. In line with this reasoning, we propose: 5 
 
H2.  The member’s perception about the liquidation price increases his/her: 
a. satisfaction with the co-operative 
b. intention to continue in the co-operative  
Neoclassical economic theory assumes perfect knowledge without uncertainty or dishonesty and with no 
costs associated to specific investments (Those that lose value in other applications or alternative uses). 
However, real world shows that actors make mistakes in uncertain environments, break their promises, 
hide information and also that investments made for a certain purpose are not transformed into other uses 
without costs
[24]. Compared to neoclassical theories and the traditional price analysis, Transaction Cost 
Economics  (TCE)  argues  that  the  savings  in  the  costs  of  transactions  (search  costs,  negotiation, 
enforcement, adaptation and in the event, rupture of the relationship) is the determining criteria for the 
selection of one or another form of organization in a continuum which includes any formula from the 
extremes which constitute the market to vertical integration
[37]. It is in a dynamic analysis of creation and 
evolution of cooperatives that prices start to differentiate little among cooperatives and their competitors 
at the origin
[8]; for this reason transaction costs with the cooperative start to become progressively more 
important  for  their  members.  These  transaction  costs  which  are  rarely  considered  in  the  heat  of  the 
monopolistic/monopsonistic  exchange  are  now  becoming  important
[8].  Therefore  the  third  hypothesis 
proposes an incremental effect of transaction costs on satisfaction and the intention to remain in the 
cooperative, once price has been considered:  
H3.   The member’s perception about the transaction costs of the co-operative significantly 
increases the explanation provided by the liquidation price over his/her: 
a. satisfaction with the co-operative 
b. intention to continue in the co-operative  
Even  if  the  first  and  more  common  applications  of  the  TCT  centre  around  the  decisions  of  vertical 
integration
[11] one stream of investigation is focusing on the study of said costs in the field of relationships 
between firms
[29], and the relationship between farmer and cooperative can be regarded as such. In this 
type of relationship the transaction costs are a consequence of the joint effect of the two suppositions 
which the TCT makes in respect to human behavior (bounded rationality and opportunism) and the two 
key  dimensions  (specific  assets  and  uncertainty).  Together  they  give  room  for  the  three  principal 
problems which generate transaction costs: The problem of safeguards, of performance evaluation and of 
adaptation
[29]. 
The  problem  of  safeguards  in  the  relationship  of  member  and  co-operative  arises  always  when  the 
member dedicates specific assets which would have very little value outside of this relationship therefore 
increasing the risk that the co-operative takes advantage of the resulting vulnerability of the member. This 
way  we  can  observe  that  opportunism  and  the  investment  in  specific  assets  are  precursors  of  this 
problem
[29]. Vertical integration is a means to avoid the problem of safeguards
[36]. Various studies for 
example, centered on the decision to integrate production of components within the company (make or 
buy), show that those which require high levels of investment in specific assets are generally produced 
internally instead of being bought externally
[18] [22].Nevertheless, within the field of inter-organizational 
relations or hybrid forms of organizing transactions, beyond the classical “make” vs. “buy”, investments 
in specific assets are safeguarded in as much as those who make them (the members) have, in the first 
place, guarantees about the receipt of an adequate level of return on their investment
[10] as well as in the 
second place access to governance mechanisms preventing opportunism by the other party, i.e. the co-
operative
[10] [35]. As a consequence hypothesis 4 was established: 
H4.  The member’s perception about better safeguards for himself increases his/her: 
a. satisfaction with the co-operative 
b. intention to continue in the co-operative 
The problem of performance evaluation arises when the member has difficulties to judge the compliance 
of obligations and performance of the co-operative
[29]. As precursor to this problem we find bounded 
rationality  and  behavioral  uncertainty.  Again  if  there  is  a  problem  in  the  evaluation  of  performance 
vertical  integration  appears  as  an  alternative  to  the  market
[1]  [18].  In  hybrid  relationships,  somewhere 
between complete integration and market, like those which exist between co-op member and the co-
operative itself, the problems of the first to judge compliance of the co-operative translates into reducing 
his satisfaction and his desire to continue as a member in the co-operative. This gives rise to: 6 
H5:  The  member’s  perception  about  better  information  to  evaluate  the  co-operative’s 
performance increases his/her: 
a. satisfaction with the co-operative. 
b. intention to continue in the co-operative. 
The problem of adaptation exists whenever there are difficulties to modify the agreement between a 
member and the co-operative due to changes in circumstances of the external environment. This problem 
is  a  consequence  of  the  presence  of  bounded  rationality  and  uncertainty  in  the  environment
[29]). 
Adaptation is important because it guarantees that the relationship evolves over time in accordance with 
environmental  changes  and  as  much  as  is  needed  until  the  point  is  reached  whereas  recommending 
vertical integration will be the preferred option due to a highly volatile environment
[36]. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary  to  say  that  this  proposition  has  only  yielded  partial  support.  In  the  context  of  inter-
organizational relations of the hybrid type, it is interesting that the results obtained by Klein and Roth 
[20] 
found that firms which confront an environment of minor uncertainty  were more satisfied with their 
relationships within the distribution channel. In the context of our investigation we postulate that:  
H6:  The member’s perception about a better adaptation of the relationship maintained with 
the co-operative increases his/her: 
a. satisfaction with the co-operative. 
b. intention to continue in the co-operative. 
Finally, with an exploratory character, we propose an idea in regards to the possible interaction of price 
with  each  one  of  the  variables  considered  in  determining  the  dimension  of  transaction  costs  in  the 
relationship member - co-operative (safeguards, information in order to evaluate performance and the 
perception of adaptation). The observation of significant effects allows us to test if the marginal effect of 
price on each dependent variable (satisfaction and intention to remain in the co-operative) increase as 
safeguards, information needed for performance evaluation and adaptation, improves
[28].  
In this case, in relationships with low transaction costs a little increase in the price obtained by the farmer 
provokes an important increase in satisfaction and desire to continue, while in relationships with high 
transaction costs the same increase in satisfaction and desire to continue requires a higher increase in the 
price received by the farmer. The underlying logic of this reasoning leads us to propose the following 
postulate: 
P1:  The effect of liquidation price on the member’s: a) satisfaction with the co-operative 
and b) intention to continue in the co-operative increases if:  
i. safeguards are perceived as better 
ii. information to evaluate the co-operative’s performance is perceived as better  
iii. adaptation of the relationship is perceived as better 
3. Methodology and results 
3.1. Data collection 
This  study’s  population  consists  of  members  of  agricultural  marketing  co-operatives  in  the  Spanish 
Region of Murcia. There are about 4,000 agricultural cooperatives in Spain which in 2006 had a turnover 
of 17,000 million Euros, more than 1 million members and more than 100,000 employees. Of these, 2091 
are affiliated with the Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives of Spain, to which the region of Murcia 
contributes 86 agricultural cooperatives, 3% of the total. 
To identify the cooperatives in the Region of Murcia and the sample elements (the members) we counted 
on the collaboration of the Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives of Murcia (FECOAM). Due to 
the  characteristics  of  the  population  (occupation  and  advanced  age)  and  the  difficulties  in  obtaining 
information  (attitudes  and  perception)  we  used  personal  interviews.  To  set  up  the  questionnaire  we 
performed a series of pre-interviews with key informants (members, members of the board of directors 
and  cooperative  managers  as  well  as  FECOAM  personnel),  which  allowed  us  to  have  a  better 
understanding of the problem in regards to the relationships subject to analysis. Afterwards we designed 
different versions of the previous questionnaire which were subjected to some preliminary pre-tests. All 
this served as a base for the elaboration of the final questionnaire.  7 
Due  to  the  difficulties  in  contacting  the  members  of  the  sample  because  of  their  wide  geographic 
dispersion we took advantage of the XIII meeting of the “Day of the Agricultural Cooperativist” which 
was  organized  by  FECOAM  and  took  place  in  the  framework  of  the  XXV  Fair  of  Mediterranean 
Agriculture in order to collect the information. We randomly obtained 277 valid questionnaires. In a 
second  run  the  collection  of  data  was  extended  to  members  of  cooperatives  which  had  not  been 
sufficiently represented in the initial sample with the idea of obtaining an adequate representation of all 
the Region’s co-operatives. This resulted in 85 additional data for a total of 362 cases. Table 1 presents a 
description of the sample. 
Table 1. Characteristics of agricultural co-operative members which form part of the sample 
 
Average  
% of male members   92,5 
% of female members  7,5 
Age  58 
Years of membership in the co-operative  17 
% of members who have the following 
education: 
Primary school not completed  33,6 
Primary school  45,6 
Secondary school graduates  9,1 
Professional training  6,6 
University studies  4,8 
Others  0,3 
% of total income coming from the agricultural activity   60 
% of income from agricultural activity through the co-operative   89 
%  of members who were part of the board of directors at some occasion   25 
Number of years they had been members of the board  9 
% of members who are presently part of the board of directors  14 
3.2. Measures 
For the measurements of the concepts we have tried to use multiple indicators which were inspired by the 
literature.  Nevertheless,  as  none  of  the  measurements  had  been  previously  used  in  the  field  of  co-
operatives, even less so in those of an agricultural nature, a major part of the work consisted of adaptation 
during pre-testing. Table 2 (left column) shows the concepts and items used in their measurement as well 
as the theoretical source they come from. 
In regards to safeguards the degree of security of the farmers to obtain the yields of their investments was 
taken into account, which is a consequence of the certainty based on volume of transactions and the 
duration  of  the  relationship
[10].  Moreover,  contractual  and  legal  mechanisms  as  well  as  trust  were 
considered  as  two  mechanisms  to  avoid  opportunism
[10]  [35].  Nevertheless,  during  the  process  of 
depuration of the scale it was observed that the item corresponding to legal guarantees represented a low 
correlation  between  item-total,  as  well  as  a  low  determination  coefficient  in  the  confirmatory  factor 
analysis (CFA). For this reason the mentioned indicator was eliminated with the understanding that the 
essence of the safeguard concept was unaltered. The mentioned behavior of this item can be motivated by 
the particular relationship between member and cooperative, a relationship which is far from the normal 
standards found in inter-organizational relationships as described in the American literature. In the case of 
the reality which is object of this study, we first consider the fact that we are dealing with relationships 
with a greater level of integration with a contract of adhesion and where the member, generally of small 
size, would have great financial difficulties to obtain justice through a court of law. In any event, the 




Table 2. Scales and Confirmatory Factor Analysis  





[10]. Scale composite validity (SCR)= .72 
1. The co-operative offers you certainty about the acquisition of all your production 
2. The co-operative offers you security about the selling of your production in the long term  
3. You have legal guarantees to act against the co-operative in case it is necessary* 








[29]. SCR= .65 
1. It is very easy to assess whether the co-operative comply with its obligations with the members  
2. Obtaining information about the co-operative management has a great deal of difficulty for you  







[29]. SCR= .760 
1. Thanks to the co-operative, your business is much better adapted to the market’s requirements.  
2. The co-operative is committed to understand the particularities of your cultivation  









[14] [3]) SCR= .768 
1. The co-operative is a good firm to do business with  
2. Overall, you are satisfied with the results of your membership in the co-op  






INTENTION TO REMAIN AS A MEMBER (Ping
[26], Selnes
[32]) SCR= .771 
1. You will not abandon the co-operative even though other alternatives were available  
2. Your relationship with the co-operative is a long-term alliance  







(79)= 197,79; GFI= ,93; RMSEA= ,067; SRMR= ,052; CFI= ,98; TLI (NNFI)= ,98. 
1Scale composite reliability (ρc= (Σλi)
2 var (ξ) / [(Σλi)
2 var (ξ) + Σθii]; Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) 
* Item eliminated as a result of the scales´ refinement process  
The  evaluation  of  performance
[29]  is  measured  by  items  which  are  applied  to  the  context  of  the 
relationship of a farmer with his/her agricultural marketing co-operative. There is emphasis on the ease of 
checking compliance of obligations of the co-operative, the difficulty to obtain information about the 
management (reversed), which is a mean of obtaining information about the performance of the general 
manager and the rest of the management team, and the ease of being able to control the activity of the 
board of directors. 
In regards to adaptation, it is measured considering the problem of adaptation as a result of the difficulty 
of the relationship to rapidly and effectively adapt to the changes of the environment
[29]. In our context, 
the different pre-tests suggest that the capacity of adaptation within the relationship can be measured as 
the  contribution  that  the  co-operative  makes  to  the  farmer’s  adaptation  to  the  environment,  the  co-
operative’s interest in getting to know the particular problems of the member and the collaboration with 
the member to solve problems and unforeseen issues.  
Finally, the two dependent variables, i.e., the member’s satisfaction with the co-operative and his/her 
intention to continue in the co-operative, are measured with statements very slightly adapted from the 
literature
[14] [3] [26] [32]. 
Unidimensionality of each construct was evaluated through the use of a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA)
[2] of 5 constructs and 15 items with LISREL 8.80. Fit of the model was considered adequate as the 
RMSEA indicators (lower than .08) and the SRMR (0,052) show very low levels while the GFI, CFI and 
the NNFI are sufficiently above 0,9 and the latter two are very close to 1
[4]. Therefore the scales shows 
reliability with scale composite reliability indices above 0.6, convergent validity with highly significant 
factor loadings (the smallest shows a significance value of p <.000) and discriminant validity, checked by 
assuring that the correlations between constructs never include 1 in their confidence interval at p<.01
[2] [4]. 9 
3.3. Models’ estimation and results 
To empirically contrast the relationships suggested in hypotheses 1 to 6 as well as in proposition 1 we 
used  regression  analysis  through  ordinary  least  squares.  Specifically,  for  each  dependent  variable 
(member’s satisfaction with the co-operative and intention to continue) a hierarchical regression analysis 
was used through the addition of successive independent variables and subsequent test of the significance 
of the change in the coefficient of determination R
2 (see Table 3). In the first model we considered two 
control variables as independent variables. These are, first, the number of years the member is in the co-
operative and, second, his/her perception in regards to the difficulty to break the relationship with the 
cooperative due to economic losses that would be incurred. Both variables have wide consideration in the 
literature of inter-organizational relationships (e.g. [19]). The successive models were analyzed with the 
conclusion that model IV in the case of satisfaction and model V in the case of intention to continue as a 
member are the best in terms of capacity of explanation taking into account their parsimony. This can be 
observed by the fact that they significantly increase the R
2 of the previous models. A major part of the 
discussion of the results is therefore based on these models. 
Table 3. Results of the hierarchical regression analysis  
Dependent Variable →  Satisfaction  Intention to continue in the co-operative 
 Independent Variable↓  M. I  M. II  M. III  M. IV  M. I  M. II  M. III  M. IV  M. V 
               




















               






Price    ,440
a  ,272
a  ,265




               
Safeguards      ,136
b  ,194
a        ,137
b  ,173
a 
Performance evaluation       ,127
b  ,111
c        ,181
a  ,150
a 
Adaptation      ,176
a  ,214




Price X Safeguards        ,214
a       
  -,009
n.s. 
Price X Performance evaluation        ,087
c       
  -,081
n.s. 
Price X Adaptation        -,033
n.s.       
  ,133
c 
               
Adjusted R
2  ,006  ,192  ,289  ,331  ,009  ,290  ,295  ,375  ,385 
Significance of change in R
2  ,373  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,092  ,000  ,071  ,000  ,045 
a p<,01; 
b p<,05; 
c p<,10; n.s.= not significant 
In  regards  to  hypothesis  1  it  has  been  observed  that  satisfaction  contributes  significantly  to  the 
explanation of the desire to remain a member, significantly increasing R
2 in the transition from M.I to 
M.II for the dependent variable “intention to continue” and obtaining a positive coefficient at p<.01 in the 
final model (M.V). These results confirm hypothesis 1. 
About hypothesis 2a, the effect of price on satisfaction, the introduction of liquidation price in M.II 
significantly increases the explaining power of the control variables (M.I). In model M. IV the effect of 
liquidation  price  on  satisfaction  remains  positive  and  significant  at  p<.01  therefore  confirming  H2a. 
About the effect of liquidation price on the intention to continue (H2b), once the satisfaction has been 
considered, the direct effect of liquidation price is considerably reduced. On one side the increase of R2 in 
the step from M.II to M.III is only significant at 90%, on the other side the impact on continuing is not 
significant  in  model  V.  The  data  appears  to  support  the  idea  of  Cook
[8]  about  the  loss  of  relative 
importance of price in planning to continue as a member once transaction costs have been considered 
(M.IV and M.V) after the first impact over the price has been absorbed by the members during the 
creation of the cooperative (or when joining the same); nevertheless its indirect effect through satisfaction 
continues. 
Hypothesis  3  about  the  incremental  contribution  that  transaction  costs  have  over  the  explanation  of 
satisfaction and the intention to remain a member based exclusively on the liquidation price received. The 
changes observed in R
2 from model II to III in the case of satisfaction and from model III to model IV in 
regards  to  the  intention  to  continue  membership  confirm  that  the  transaction  costs  contributes 
significantly, as postulated in hypothesis 3.  10 
The  three  variables  of  transaction  costs  considered,  i.e.,  safeguards,  evaluation  of  performance  and 
adaptation, contribute positively and significantly to satisfaction (M.IV) and the intention to remain a 
member (M.V) thus confirming the expectations presented by hypotheses 4, 5 and 6. 
Proposition I for its part pointed as an explication to the possible interaction of liquidation price and 
transaction costs. The high significance obtained in the change in R2 when passing from M. III to M.IV in 
the case of satisfaction, jointly with the observation of the two significant interactions, seems to indicate 
that such interaction takes place. The effect of liquidation price on satisfaction increases significantly 
when safeguards are greater as well as when the capacity of members to evaluate the performance of the 
co-operative is greater. 
To say it in another way, those co-operatives that have low transaction costs for their members increase to 
a large measure the satisfaction of the members by even a small improvement in liquidation price while 
those  which  have  higher transaction costs need a  much higher increase in prices to obtain the same 
improvement in satisfaction. 
In regards to intention to remain a member the interaction is less pronounced. This time adaptation of the 
co-operative  is  the  variable  which  interacts  positively  with  the  liquidation  price  in  determining  the 
intention  to  remain  a  member.  The  result  makes  sense  as  in  regards  to  the  intention  to  continue 
membership it seems more logical that the most important factor is the flexibility of the relationship and 
its capacity to adapt to the environment in as much as the farmer would be more willing to give up certain 
advantages on the liquidation price if the capacity of adaptation is greater. 
4. Conclusions 
In a recent work, Bijman and Hendrikse
[7] justify the creation of agricultural co-operatives due to three 
main reasons which affect the farmer: His market power (a neoclassical argument), the availability of 
incomplete and asymmetrical information and the necessity to invest in specific assets (these two factors 
are  related  to  transaction  costs).  In  this  research,  the  Neoclassical  Theory  and  the  Transaction  Cost 
Theory have been used in the context of the relationship of agricultural marketing co-operatives with their 
members to explain the members’ satisfaction and intention to continue in the relationship. The results 
confirm the idea that the liquidation price plays an important role in explaining the members’ satisfaction 
with the co-operative (therefore supporting the validity of the neoclassical theory). However, transaction 
costs play a more relevant role in explaining not only satisfaction, but also the desire to continue the 
relationship. This is in line  with the findings by  Cook
[8]  who found that the longer the co-operative 
persists in the market the lower the price difference between the co-operative and other competitors since 
co-operatives provoke a readjustment in market power; price then becomes a relatively less important 
factor while transaction costs increase in importance. 
The management of the co-operative should therefore try to reduce the farmers´ transaction costs offering 
him safeguards, information which permits the members to have knowledge about the performance of the 
co-operative and at the same time adapting the relationship to changes in the environment. Specifically, 
members’ satisfaction is much influenced by the presence of safeguards, which not only influence it 
positively, but also have a high interaction with the liquidation price. This means that when comparing 
the co-operative with other alternatives the sales price does not have to be the determining factor if 
safeguards are perceived to be higher. Something similar happens with the farmer’s access to information 
which allows him/her to evaluate the performance of the co-operative. In regards to the desire to remain a 
member, this variable is of very high importance to the management of the co-operative, as it is a variable 
which explains the possibilities of long term existence of the co-operative as a market- operator. In this 
sense  we  observed  that  the  liquidation  price  is  not  quite  so  important,  as  safeguards,  performance 
evaluation and adaptation. Safeguards are so important because they give the member security about 
opportunistic  behavior  of  the  co-operative  and  the  ability  to  evaluate  performance  also  positively 
influences the desire to continue as a member. As long term membership is at stake this element is of high 
importance  as  a  mechanism  to  control  the  decisions  of  the  co-operative.  The  same  is  the  case  with 
adaptation, i.e., the higher it is the more it motivates the farmer to stay in the co-operative as it supposedly 
gives him a guarantee against the changes which can happen in the environment on the long run. 11 
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